Whe n I w as growing up—in the University in Delhi during the 1 9 7 0 s — b e i n g called a conservative was a term of abuse in academic circles. This has slightly changed over the past half a decade, but not that much. In those days, for the Left, both liberals and conservatives were class enemies and not to be associated with. The Left rather derided them as ‘running dogs of imperialism.’ However, though liberals were in argument with the Left, they stayed clear of conservatives even when on a range of issues like rights and freedoms; the position of the two sides were broadly similar. Conservatism practically did not exist and, even today, is a bit of rarity. And yet Indians are defined broadly as conservative.

Why do we have very few self-declared conservatives in public life or in academia? This is an issue that needs to be probed further. Several observations need to made here. One, there is this perceived association of conservatism with colonial rule, with men like Winston Churchill and Linlithgow who denigrated Indians and did their best to derail the freedom movement. On the other hand, it was the Labor Party generally and the Left in particular that were seen as facilitating India’s freedom. This reputation is actually quite undeserved and even persons like Harold Laski or George Orwell were reluctant to see India break loose of the British Empire. Indians also seem to have forgotten that Attlee, a Labor Party leader, was a member of the infamous Simon mission, and by 1946, a solid member of British establishment. Two, the impact of Western intelligentsia on Indian intelligentsia, who are mostly anti-conservative. This was particularly true of places like the London School of Economics then, and American universities at present. Conservatives are a much derided community in Western academia and, since we look in that direction for validation, conservative-minded Indian intellectuals do not find adequate rolemodels to guide them. Three, paradoxically, India’s tense relations with the West during the Cold War did not help the Indian conservative cause either.

The West was seen as heirs to the imperial powers, and resistance to them was the only way for newly independent countries like India to emerge as spokespersons of the decolonized world. Politically, the Soviet Union and, ideologically, the Left emerged as natural allies of the NonAligned block as it took on the US and its allies. Southeast and East Asian countries that adopted the capitalist model of development and were pro-American politically were looked down upon as ‘stooges,’ even though they proved far more successful in achieving high rates of economic growth. Four, since conservatism is not about bringing out revolutionary change, nor about a Utopia upon earth (or thereafter), it did not, and does not, take care to articulate a well-developed ideology. This placed it at a disadvantage in a society that was newly emerging from centuries of colonialism and oppression, where people looked forward to catchy slogans and hoped for a better tomorrow.

To a great extent, this limitation remains, along with the reluctance to formulate sensible economic policies that conservatives espouse elsewhere and actually deliver better outcomes in societies that have adopted them, including a far better record at abolishing poverty while keeping economic inequality in check. What made the situation worse for Indian conservatism was that it was quickly identified with the rich and the haves like maharajas, industrialists, and zamindars. The movement of history too went against Indian conservatives. The deaths of Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Patel and the marginalization of C. Rajagopalachari (Rajaji) meant that the Nehruvian line prevailed in independent India—politically, economically, and socially. During the freedom movement, the conservatives had also not articulated their views on different aspects in a coherent manner, though they resisted the multiple efforts of Nehru, Bose, Jayaprakash Narayan, and others to steer the Congress Leftwards. Gandhi’s death at the hands of a follower of Savarkar, the primary ideologue of Hindutva, and the banning of the RSS meant that conservatives were reluctant to engage with Indic traditions.

Western conservatism had no relevance in the Indian context since it is firmly rooted in the Judeo-Christian milieu, anchored in the Westphalian NationState, itself premised on one nation, one State, one people, one religion, one language. The questions then arise are is: What is Indian conservatism? Is there anything to conserve in a society that is unequal, has seen tremendously oppressive social systems, and is still a poor ? Do conservatives believe in the status quo only? What are its economic and political implications? This write-up attempts to answer these questions. Indian conservatism is about all that is good in our culture, our traditions, and our institutions. The easiest way to destroy a society is make it forget its collective memories and its historical experience. These are real and tangible, and not imagined as Benedict Anderson would have us believe. Proselytizing religions and colonial masters also sought (and seek) to wipe out all evidence of a prior culture by burning libraries and books, demolishing temples and statues and banning social customs that survive the violent changes imposed by new rulers and religions.

Indians have retained enough knowledge and insights from even prehistory to claim that their traditions and epics are living realities, not dead knowledge boxed in museums and in books. The best proof of its living nature is that Indians, faced with colonialism and modernity, did not have to create an Indian nation; it was already there. A nation need not be necessarily conflated with a nation-state, which for Indians is a new phenomenon. In any case, the Indian nation-state has established itself very firmly in a very short period, as its fundamentals were widely accepted. This is very different from elsewhere. It is rightly said that it was 19th century Italian nationalism that created the Italian nation; in contrast, it was the Indian nation in response to colonial rule and lack of agency that created Indian nationalism.

This argument about the prior existence of the Indian nation can be elaborated elsewhere; here it is sufficient to note that the lack of a common political space historically did not come in the way of a common identity of India. This should not be taken to mean that Indians should feel smug and conclude that nothing needs change, or that we were/are an ideal society. This is far from the truth. In any case, critical self-reflection is intrinsic to being a conservative. Critique, discuss, and building consensus for change is a never ending process. But critically, the change conservatives advocate is incremental, and not revolutionary. The question that arises is: why is revolutionary change not sought?

History tells us that revolutionary violence leaves the disadvantaged worse off than before because their fragile social, economic support systems simply cannot cope up with the destruction of order, however unequal. The elite, or parts of it, regroup and start jostling for a place in the emerging order. Meanwhile in the absence of traditional inhibiting factors, there is descent into totalitarianism. The result is violence and mayhem, and the revolution not only devours its children but leaves most much worseoff than they were before. On the other hand, the alternative to revolution is to use the corrective mechanism available to bring about change. Even totalitarian regimes generally need societal acceptability to survive, thereby leaving small openings for advocates for change. Scholars have pointed out that behind even major changes are years of analyses, ideation, propagation, and advocacy. The greater the acceptability of new ideas, the more sustainable the change. These principles do not rule out sudden changes necessitated when faced with imminent danger or an unbearable situation, but as an exception, not the norm.

The Indian adage ‘Ekam Sat Viprah Bahuda Vadanti’ is as relevant today as it was when first articulated thousands of years ago. It is difficult to argue with the proposition that no one has the monopoly over truth and that your way as valid as mine. If this is accepted, then the only way in dealing with diversity is to discuss and argue. There can be no discrimination based on differences in thoughts, beliefs, physical factors, etc., and no imposition either. And no final word either, for each conclusion is the beginning of a new debate as Hegel pointed out. Is there any economic thinking that is compatible with Indian conservatism? There can be no arguments about the fundamental principle that markets are the most successful coordination device allocating resources in a large economy. Conservatism is comfortable with markets since the former is about human agency, which is the only way non-confrontational, non-antagonistic societies evolve.

Any form of planning is necessarily top-down, and since it seeks to impose and bring about uniformity, it is by definition, authoritarian. Even if the process of arriving at policies is consultative, the implementation of such policies cannot face opposition or deal with the millions of alternatives possible at different steps on the way. The link between economic planning, that does not brook any autonomous economic activity via the markets, and political authoritarianism is pretty robust (There are also economic arguments why economic planning generally fails, especially as it is unable to deal with complexity but which need not be pursued here). At the same time, the belief in free markets should not be equated with market fundamentalism. Economy and material assets are important, but there is more to life than them. There are societal assets and features that are not amenable to markets. These would include belief systems, values, ethics, aesthetics, and the like.

An artist, craftsperson, or writer selling their creations or works of art may be an economic activity that is an exercise in agency but when it comes to larger bodies or works, systems and other intangible assets, these are collectively owned and incapable of being alienated in the market. But is there any concept of the ‘State’ in Indic traditions. Clearly, there are no signs of any divine right of kings. In fact, the Raja needed social acceptance (or at least no open, hostile resistance) in order to sustain his regime. The State itself was a very limited one, unlike the Confucian State. The fundamental duty of the State in India was to uphold dharma— justice, uphold contracts, etc. Since social stability was the desired goal, the State should promote and facilitate economic activities (agriculture, manufacturing, trade, etc.) but not control it.

A healthy economy meant that sufficient taxes could be collected in order to meet the security needs of the State. The Mauryas, the first documented Indian State had the Controller of Currencies, of Weights & Measures, of Navigation, of Mining in order to facilitate economic activity and uphold justice. Therefore, while the State’s responsibility was to ensure safety in society (external security and internal order), there was to be no interference in social issues or in belief systems. Society was to autonomously look after traditions, manage temples, or be the site for contest of human imagination with no role for the State. And while Rajas were free to support temples through land grants, etc., such support was not to be partisan. It is for this reason that the most effective reform/protest movements have arisen within societies and have not relied on royal patronage. Preachers like the Buddha, Mahavira, the Bhakti movement, Basava, Nanak, and Narayan Guru succeeded, because they were located in society which they worked to transform. If today, despite best legal efforts at social equality, untouchability survives in different forms, it is because legal remedies without social push are inadequate. Indian society should abolish caste if it is serious about abolishing untouchability and bring about social equality. Legal support is important but not enough to achieve such transformative changes.

A question that arises is: how Indian conservatism is different from classical liberalism? Unlike liberalism, conservatism is not just about the individual but about the society too. But unlike what the Left upholds, it is not just about society with no value for the individual. It seeks a balance between the two—the individual and the community. Deendayal Upadhyaya’s Integral Human Worldview (Ekatma Manav Darshan, not Ekatma Manavwad since the latter would restrict it to a fixed formula) sought to achieve such a balance, for example. Historically, Indians have sought to balance community wisdom and individual choice, with no contradiction between the two. The lack of a definitive dogma allows for accommodation, accepting that there can be no monopoly of truth. Indian conservatism is, therefore, more a way at looking at life than just living it.

Shakti Sinha,

The author, a former IAS officer, is Director, Nehru Memorial Museum Library